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Criminal Law. State v. Moten, 187 A.3d 1080 (R.I. 2018). Without
a specific objection, an issue is determined to have been waived for
purposes of appeal. The trial justice serves as the thirteenth juror,
considering all of the material evidence in the record and
independently weighing that evidence. If, after this assessment,
the trial justice reaches the same conclusion as the jury, then the
verdict should be affirmed and the motion for a new trial should be
denied.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The altercation at issue in this case was the culmination of a
long-standing rivalry between two Providence gangs, YNIC and the
Chad Brown gang.1 On the morning of October 22, 2014, Bruce
Moten (Defendant), Henry Lopez (Henry), 2 and Tevin Briggs
(Tevin), all members of the YNIC gang, were at the Garrahy
Judicial Complex when they spoke with two other YNIC gang
members who had “got into a situation”: members of the Chad
Brown gang had surrounded the two men on the fourth floor of the
courthouse.3 About an hour after leaving the courthouse, the
Defendant, Henry, and Tevin received a phone call from fellow
YNIC member Antonio Fortes (Tone) informing them that Kendrick
Johnson (Kendrick), a Chad Brown gang member, was at the PC
Mart on the corner of Douglas Avenue and Eaton Street in
Providence.4 At the suggestion of the Defendant, Henry drove the
Defendant and Tevin to the PC Mart to follow Kendrick.5 The
Defendant, Henry, and Tevin were in Henry’s black Infiniti.6

1. State v. Moten, 187 A.3d 1080, 1081 (R.I. 2018).
2. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, parties will be referred to by their
first names.
3. Id. at 1082.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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When the three YNIC members arrived at the PC Mart, they
noticed Kendrick, Delacey Andrade (Delacey), and Terry Robinson
(Terry), all Chad Brown gang members, leaving the store. 7 Henry
proceeded to follow Kendrick’s car to the Chad Brown housing
complex. 8 Leaving Henry at the wheel of the parked car, the
Defendant and Tevin exited Henry’s car with their hoods pulled up
and guns in the waistbands of their sweatpants. 9 Upon hearing
several gunshots, Henry drove to the intersection of Fillmore and
Oregon Street, where the Defendant and Tevin met him “with their
guns in their hands.” 10 Henry then drove the two men to the home
of one of his girlfriends, Yhaira Montanez (Yadi). 11
At the direction of Henry and Tevin, Yadi drove Henry’s black
Infiniti to the home of Courtney Rivers (Courtney). 12 When Yadi
returned to her home, she found the three men sitting with their
guns at her kitchen table discussing the earlier incident.13 During
this time, the Defendant told Yadi “[i]t was either us or them” while
displaying scars on his stomach.14
On April 10, 2015 the Defendant, Henry, Tevin, and Tone were
all indicted in Providence County Superior Court and charged with
nine felony counts: murder; discharging a firearm while committing
a crime of violence, death resulting; assault with a dangerous
weapon; discharging a firearm while committing a crime of
violence, injury resulting; assault with a dangerous weapon;
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence;
conspiracy; and two counts of carrying a pistol without a license.15
Henry entered into a cooperation agreement with the State in
exchange for a fifty-year sentencing cap.16 Beginning on October 4,
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Providence police received a report of the shooting at
approximately 11:30 a.m. Id. Emergency personnel arrived at the crime scene
to find Terry “gunned down and deceased” and Delacey injured with a gunshot
wound to his buttocks. Id. at 1082–83. The Court noted that Henry was also
dating another woman at the time of the incident. Id. at 1082 n.3.
12. Id. at 1083.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1083–84.
16. Id. at 1084.
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2016, the Defendant was tried before a jury in Superior Court.17
The trial lasted ten days. 18
Henry testified at the trial about the fatal shooting. 19 Henry’s
testimony was corroborated by a multitude of technical evidence
presented by the State. 20 The evidence included video footage
depicting Henry, Tevin, and the Defendant entering the Garrahy
Judicial Complex; video showing Kendrick’s black Camry at the PC
Mart; and a video from the Chad Brown housing complex depicting
Henry’s black Infiniti driving around the area of the crime scene,
two men walking in the direction of Fillmore Street and then racing
back to the Infiniti, and the Infiniti speeding down Fillmore
Street. 21 Additionally, the State introduced cell-site data and cell
phone records that further corroborated Henry’s story. 22
The State presented “Agent Jennifer Banks of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cellular Analysis Survey Team
(CAST), as an expert witness in historical cell-site analysis.” 23
After extensive research and analysis, Agent Banks determined
that the “[D]efendant’s phone was in or near the area of the
shooting at the time.” 24 At no point did the Defendant object to
Agent Banks’s testimony. 25
The State also introduced the testimony of Detective Theodore
Michael, a forensic cell phone examiner with the Providence Police
Department.26 The Defendant objected to Detective Michael’s
testimony, questioning his expertise in in the field of historical cellsite analysis. 27 The State responded, explaining that Agent Banks
offered the expert testimony on cell-site analysis, while Detective
Michael’s testimony would encompass only the data he physically
obtained from the various cell phones involved.28 The trial justice
overruled the Defendant’s objection stating, “I’m satisfied that the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1084–85.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1086.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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witness has sufficient qualifications to testify in the mode that the
State is going to pursue. The objection is overruled. Do you wish
to have any voir dire?” 29 The Defendant declined to question
Detective Michael about his qualifications and did not object to any
portion of his trial testimony. 30
At trial, the Defendant submitted the theory that it was
actually Courtney, not the Defendant, who was involved in the
shooting.31 However, Detective Michael testified that Courtney’s
cell phone was not near the crime scene at the time of the murder
by using historical cell-site information contained in Courtney’s call
log. 32 On cross-examination, the Defendant attempted to rebut
Detective Michael’s testimony by asserting that someone else could
have been using Courtney’s cell phone while Courtney was at the
crime scene. 33
At the completion of the State’s case, the trial justice “granted
the [D]efendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count 9,
carrying a pistol without a license.” 34 On October 18, 2016, the jury
found the Defendant guilty of the remaining eight counts. 35 The
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that Henry was the sole
witness who was able to put the Defendant at the crime scene and
that the State had failed to introduce any other competent evidence
to prove the Defendant was one of the shooters. 36 The trial justice
denied the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced the
Defendant to two consecutive life sentences, with an additional
seventy years, and a ten year suspended sentence with probation. 37
The Defendant timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court (the Court), arguing that the trial justice erred by permitting
Detective Michael to offer a lay person’s opinion concerning the
location of Courtney’s cell phone at the time of the shooting and by
denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial. 38
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1087.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1087–88.
38. Id. at 1081, 1088.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Defendant argued that (1) the Detective’s
testimony severely undercut the Defendant’s theory that it was
Courtney, and not the Defendant, who participated in the shooting
and (2) Detective Michael was neither qualified as an expert in
historical cell-site analysis nor did he possess the knowledge and
training to contribute a technically sound opinion. 39 The Court
determined that the Defendant had waived the second argument
regarding Detective Michael’s qualifications.40 The Court cited the
“raise-or-waive rule,” which states that “‘if an issue was not
preserved by specific objection at trial, then it may not be
considered on appeal.’” 41 Explaining the policy, the Court stated
that “[t]his Court ‘requires a specific objection so that the allegation
of error can be brought to the attention of the trial justice, who will
then have an opportunity to rule on it.’” 42
The Court then noted that the Defendant did not raise an
objection to any portion of Detective Michael’s testimony, but on
appeal is taking issue with the portion of Detective Michael’s
testimony which places Courtney away from the scene of
shooting.43 The Court made it clear that the Defendant cannot
object to Detective Michael’s testimony at the appellate level when
he did not object in Superior Court. 44 The Court stated, “[t]he
defendant is not entitled to a ‘do over’ simply because he is not
satisfied with how his trial strategy panned out.” 45
The Defendant also asserted that the trial justice “erred in
denying his motion for a new trial based on the weight of the
evidence . . . contend[ing] that he was entitled to a new trial because
the only evidence incriminating him as a principal shooter came
from Henry, who, [the Defendant] alleges, had a motive to lie based
upon his plea agreement.” 46 In response, the Court explained for
new trial motions based on the weight of the evidence,

39. Id. at 1088.
40. Id. (citing State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
41. Id. (quoting Pona, 66 A.3d at 468).
42. Id. (quoting Pona, 66 A.3d at 468).
43. Id. at 1088.
44. Id. at 1089.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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[t]he trial justice must consider, in the exercise of his [or
her] independent judgment, all the material evidence in
the case, in the light of his [or her] charge to the jury and
pass on its weight and the credibility of the witnesses,
determine what evidence is believable, and, decide whether
the verdict rendered by the jury responds to the evidence
presented and does justice between the parties. 47
Here, the Court recognized the trial justice’s detailed
summarization of the evidence and emphasized that he “carefully
performed his duty as a thirteenth juror, considering all of the
material evidence in the record and independently weighing that
evidence.” 48 For these reasons, the Court affirmed the judgment of
the Superior Court.49
COMMENTARY
The Court affirmed the findings of the Superior Court, in part,
because the Defendant did not state a specific objection at trial and
therefore was not permitted to raise the objection on appeal. 50
Here, the Court made it clear that unless there is a specific
objection, the issue has not been properly preserved for appeal. 51
Strict compliance with the “raise or waive” rule 52 is necessary to
give the trial justice the opportunity to rule on the issue 53 and to
prevent a defendant from appealing when his trial strategy did not
pan out in an attempt to seek a “do over.” 54
The Court also correctly decided the Defendant’s second claim
of error, where the Defendant asserted that the trial justice erred
by denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the
weight of the evidence.55 The Court examined the trial record and
the trial justice’s detailed notes—affording great deference to his
credibility determinations. 56 The Court looked to precedent to
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (quoting McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 280 (R.I. 2012)).
Id. at 1089–90.
Id.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1088 (quoting State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
See id. at 1089.
See id. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
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justify the great deference afforded to trial justices explaining,
“‘[w]e do not have the same vantage point as [him or her] and we
are unable to assess the witness’ demeanor, tone of voice, and body
language.’” 57
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court because the Defendant failed to state a specific
objection and therefore waived the issue for appeal, and because the
Court found no error on the part of the trial justice in denying the
Defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Anna L. Kramer

57.

Id. (quoting State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 778 (R.I. 2012)).

